Scienti…c knowledge is believed to be the wellspring of innovation. Historically, …rms have also invested in research to fuel innovation and growth. In this paper, we document a shift away from scienti…c research by large corporations between 1980 and 2007. We …nd that publications by company scientists have declined over time in a range of industries. We also …nd that the value attributable to scienti…c research has dropped, whereas the value attributable to technical knowledge (as measured by patents) has remained stable. These e¤ects appear to be associated with globalization and narrower …rm scope, rather than changes in publication practices or a decline in the usefulness of science as an input into innovation. Large …rms appear to value the golden eggs of science (as re ‡ected in patents) but not the golden goose itself (the scienti…c capabilities). These …ndings have important implications for both public policy and management.
Introduction
There is an extensive literature in strategy on corporate engagement in scienti…c research (e.g., Rosenberg, 1990; Gambardella, 1995; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Fleming and Sorenson, 2004; Pisano, 2006; Durand et al., 2008) . Despite the well-known problems of appropriability, many leading American and European …rms have invested in science, and such investments have resulted in some major scienti…c and technological breakthroughs. Corporations invested in science primarily to develop signi…cant new products and processes, but also to help absorb external knowledge, and perhaps to attract talented workers (Griliches, 1986; Gambardella, 1995; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998 ).
Since the 1990s, however, many leading …rms have reduced their investments in science. 1 Articles in the popular press lament the demise of top- ‡ight corporate labs, crediting the rise of small research-intensive start-ups, often fuelled by venture capitalists (e.g., Economist, 2007) . Other accounts blame the growing …nancial considerations that cloud the judgment of managers (Lazonick, 2013) . Data from the National Science Foundation show that the share of basic and applied research in corporate R&D in the United States has declined from 28% in 1985 to 21% in 2009. 2 However, classifying expenditures as either "research" or "development" is di¢ cult. Furthermore, …rm-level data are not publicly available, making it di¢ cult to assess whether the aggregate trends re ‡ect changes in the behavior of existing …rms or other factors, such as a change in the industrial mix of reporting …rms.
We develop publication-based indicators of scienti…c research at the …rm level. We link scienti…c publications in "hard science" journals (including engineering science) from the Web of Science to publicly traded …rms in the United States, using the a¢ liations of the authors. Our primary …rm sample consists of 1,014 companies with at least one patent over the period 1980-2007. Collectively, these …rms account for 312,000 "…rm publications" -scienti…c articles where at least one of the authors is a company employee. In addition, we use …rm-level information on variables such as patents, stock market value, book value of capital, and R&D expenditures.
Using these data, we document how corporate research has changed in large …rms, and provide important clues about what has driven these changes. Over the period 1980-2007, we …nd that investments in scienti…c research by publicly traded American companies have diminished. More-over, the implied value of scienti…c capability, as measured by stock market valuations or by the acquisition price in M&A deals, has also declined. Speci…cally, we show: (i) a decline in publications by large American …rms; (ii) a decline in the market value premium of the stock of publications;
(iii) a fall in the acquisition premium paid for publications in M&A deals; and (iv) a decline in post-acquisition publication activity by target-…rm scientists. By contrast, over the same time period: (v) patenting by large American …rms has increased and (vi) the implied value of patents, including the premium paid for patents in M&A, has not decreased. These patterns are present across a range of industries, except perhaps biotechnology. We …nd similar results for European …rms (both public and private) that we matched with our patent and publication data, indicating that these trends are not just con…ned to American …rms.
A concern is that our results may merely re ‡ect changes in how …rms protect their knowledge.
Large …rms may still invest in science but simply publish less, perhaps in order to patent or better protect their research …ndings. In principle, the strengthening of intellectual property, particularly patents, should encourage rather than discourage …rms from publishing (Gans et al., 2013) . But if the …rms are eschewing publication to avoid inadvertent disclosure of commercially valuable …ndings, they should particularly avoid applied scienti…c journals, which are more likely to contain …ndings close to commercial applications. We …nd, instead, that the decline in …rm publications is especially marked for publications in journals dedicated to basic rather than applied research.
Moreover, provided that science remains valuable, changes in publication behavior should not a¤ect the premium for scienti…c capability paid by acquiring …rms in M&A, contrary to what we …nd.
Overall, our results suggest that large …rms are withdrawing from investing in science internally and focusing more on development (less "R" and more "D,") rather than simply changing their publication behavior. Large …rms continue to value the golden eggs that science can produce but are unwilling to invest in the golden goose itself.
Firms would reduce investment in science if science itself becomes less useful for innovation (Jones, 2009; Gordon, 2012) . However, we do not see any decline in the number of patent citations to science over time, nor do we …nd any evidence that the science used in inventions is growing older.
Thus, the decline in private investments in science cannot be explained away by a reduction in the usefulness of new science. Similarly, although problems of appropriating the bene…ts of scienti…c research are well known, there is no evidence that these problems have worsened over time. If anything, stronger patent and copyright laws appear to have made scienti…c knowledge easier to protect.
We interpret these patterns as part of a longer historical process wherein …rms are specializing in di¤erent parts of the innovation value chain. Large …rms are relying more upon external inventions and less upon internal research. This withdrawal of large …rms from science has been accompanied by a growing division of innovative labor in which large …rms focus on development and commercialization, leaving universities and small …rms to generate new ideas (e.g., Arora and Gambardella, 1994 ; Arora et al., 2001; Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006; Mowery, 2009 ). The present paper also highlights two important correlates of this historical process: increasing global competition and changes in …rm scope. We …nd that both global competition and a narrowing of …rm scope are associated with a shift away from the creation of new knowledge and toward the commercial application and protection of existing knowledge. These …ndings suggest that competition has nuanced e¤ects on a …rm's innovation strategy; most importantly, however, competition appears to shift managerial focus towards short-term results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some historical and conceptual background for the empirical analysis, and relates our work to the existing literature. Section 3 discusses our data sources. Sections 4 to 7 describe our econometric speci…cations and present our estimation results. Section 8 discusses some of the implications of our …ndings, while Section 9 concludes.
Conceptual background and contribution to the literature 2.1. Evolution of corporate research
Corporate investments in science began modestly. The leading …rms of the 1870s and 1880s, such as the railroad companies and Western Union, mostly relied on external inventions and established industrial labs to evaluate the quality of inputs (Mowery, 1995; Carlson, 2013) . Growing competition, anti-trust pressures, and the increasing output of university-trained PhDs led companies such as GE and DuPont to invest in internal research to generate new products and processes to fuel growth (Reich, 1985; Hounshell and Smith, 1986) . The process gained momentum during the inter-war years, as corporations grew larger and more anxious to control and "routinize"innovation.
Landmark discoveries (e.g., vacuum tubes, radio, synthetic rubber, nylon), the growing practical applicability of recently discovered scienti…c principles, and the rapid increase in government funding in the United States led to more companies investing in internal research after World War II.
But corporate research often failed to deliver returns to shareholders. Discoveries such as nylon and the transistor were few and far between. And even when fundamental advances in science or technology were made, the sponsoring …rms often failed to pro…t from these advances. The graphical user interface, for instance, was invented in Xerox's PARC, but other …rms, most notably Apple and Microsoft, reaped the rewards. By the 1980s, …rms began to look to universities and small start-ups as sources of ideas and new products, using a mix of contracts, licenses, alliances, and outright acquisitions. Many corporate labs were closed, downsized, or redirected toward more commercial applications (Pisano, 2010) .
NSF data indicate that …rms with more than 10,000 employees accounted for 73 percent of nonfederally funded R&D in 1985. By 1998, this share had dropped to 54 percent, and to 51 percent by 2008 (Mowery, 2009 ). An additional indicator of the decline in the relative importance of large …rms is the sharp drop in share of large …rms in the R&D 100 awards winners: whereas 41 percent of the awards went to Fortune 500 …rms in 1971, only 6 percent went to Fortune 500 …rms in 2006 (Block and Keller, 2009 ).
Several factors contributed to the growing importance of small …rms' research. Encouraged by the 1980 Bayh-Dole act, universities and other research institutions began to commercialize their discoveries more actively. University scientists found increasingly attractive to start their own businesses, whose high-powered incentives and nimble ways are di¢ cult to replicate in large, established …rms encumbered by bureaucracy, politics, and the burden of past legacies (Christensen and Bower, 1996; Sull et al., 1997) . Changes in the institutional and legal environment have complemented these trends. Start-ups can get …nancing from venture capitalists and SBIR and other government programs (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Mazzucato, 2013) . Intellectual property rights have been signi…cantly strengthened starting from the early 1980s, …rst in the U.S. and subsequently in other countries (Ja¤e and Lerner, 2004; Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2007).
These developments have promoted a new division of labor, where small start-ups specialize in scienti…c research and larger, more established …rms specialize in product development and commercialization (Arora and Gambardella, 1994; Arora et al., 2001) . In this view, smaller …rms have a comparative advantage in generating ideas whereas larger …rms have an advantage in exploiting them. Large …rms may invest in scienti…c capability to be e¤ective buyers of knowledge.
Changing value of investments in scienti…c research
Typically, investments in scienti…c research are undertaken by …rms to create new products or processes and to absorb outside technology. Innovations sometimes arise directly from scienti…c advance (e.g., new drugs) and sometimes as indirect outputs of scienti…c research (e.g., laser). In other cases, scienti…c research enhances the productivity of technical search, by guiding it toward more fruitful pastures (Evenson and Kislev, 1976, Gambardella, 1995; Fleming and Sorenson, 2004) .
Investments in scienti…c research also help …rms absorb outside technology (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Gambardella, 1992; Arora and Gambardella, 1994) . Company scientists can help identify promising new inventions, engage with the relevant outside researchers, and help assimilate and adapt outside technology. Publishing in academic journals and attending conferences, in particular, may be the most e¤ective way to remain "plugged in"to the external scienti…c network (Rosenberg, 1990; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998) . Narin et al. (1997) propose using citations by patents to scienti…c publications to measure the use of science in innovation. Van Looy et al. (2003) …nd a positive relationship between the science intensity of patents (i.e., the citations to the scienti…c, non-patent literature) and technological productivity, in ten science-intensive technological domains. We …nd that patents by our sample …rms continue to cite science at the same rate as before, and the age of the cited publications is constant over time, indicating that new scienti…c discoveries continue to be relevant for innovation. Moreover, publishing …rms cite more recent science than non-publishing …rms, indicating that scienti…c capability continues to bestow an advantage in terms of being able to absorb more recent scienti…c …ndings. 3 Many scholars have documented the …nancial bene…ts of investment in science. Griliches (1986) analyzes the drivers of productivity and pro…ts for a sample of the 1,000 largest manufacturing …rms in the U.S. For the period 1957-1977, he …nds that the share of basic research in the …rm's R&D expenditure was positively related to measures of productivity growth. We follow Griliches in linking market value to research but use citation weighted publication stock, consistent with Gambardella, (1992) and Cockburn and Henderson (1998) . Hall et al. (2005) use a market value approach to measure the return to R&D investment for U.S. …rms in the 1980s but do not distinguish between research and development. A positive relationship can also be found between the market valuation of …rms and the science intensity of their patents (Deng et al., 1999) or their stocks of scienti…c publications (Simeth and Cincera, 2013) .
These studies do not examine how the value of investments in science has changed over time, and 3 Engaging in scienti…c activities also enhances the reputation of the …rm and certi…es the quality of its research to prospective investors, employees, government agencies, and sophisticated customers (Hicks, 1995; Audretsch and Stephan, 1996) . Clinical studies, for instance, are routinely used by …rms in the pharmaceutical industry to advertise the e¤ectiveness of their drugs to doctors and hospitals (Azoulay, 2002) . Also, to the extent that allowing employees to publish helps …rms recruit more talented researchers, participating in the process of advancing science can be a pro…table strategy for some …rms (Stern, 2004; Roach and Sauermann, 2010) . Our …ndings do not speak to these possible reasons for engaging in scienti…c research.
why. Yet, understanding the trade-o¤s involved in managing science within corporate boundaries is of fundamental strategic importance for technology …rms.
Firms face a number of challenges in generating returns from scienti…c research. The wellknown appropriability problem is only one of these. For even when patents are e¤ective, managing research is challenging. Research, as opposed to development, tends to involve projects with long time horizons and uncertain outcomes. Choosing suitable research projects, providing researchers with appropriate goals, and monitoring their performance is di¢ cult, especially for managers whose expertise is commercial rather than scienti…c (Kay, 1988) . Investments in research are more produc- A fundamental challenge …rms face in appropriating the returns from research is recognizing its commercial value. In part, this can attributed to a natural tendency of both individuals and organizations to search locally (March and Simon, 1958; Stuart and Podolny, 1996) . Firms are most likely to invest in innovation projects that are related to their existing operations (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Chesbrough, 2002) . This implies that diversi…ed …rms may be the ones best positioned to exploit the unpredictable outcomes of scienti…c research. As Nelson (1959: 302) notes, "[a] broad technological base insures that, whatever direction the path of research may take, the results are likely to be of value to the sponsoring …rm". Using …rm-level data on sales concentration to measure …rm scope, we provide support for these ideas. We …nd that decreases in …rm scope are associated with a reduction in publications, and a decline in the stock market value of publications.
A second, possibly interrelated reason for the decline in investments in science by large …rms is increasing global competition. Theoretically, greater competition has ambiguous e¤ects on the propensity of leading …rms to develop innovations internally. On the one hand, competition drives price-cost margins down and thus discourages investments in R&D, but on the other hand, successful innovation may be the only way to "escape"competition and low price-cost margins (Aghion et al., 2005) . Empirical work on the topic, while extensive, has been largely inconclusive (see across twelve European countries, and …nd that Chinese import competition led to increases in 7 patenting, IT, and TFP. For a smaller sample of 459 R&D-performing …rms, they also …nd that Chinese import competition led to an increase in R&D. We too …nd that greater Chinese import penetration is associated with an increase in patenting. However, we also …nd that competition from China is associated with reductions in investments in science, R&D expenditures, and physical investment. These …ndings suggest that low-cost competition may have di¤erent e¤ects depending on the type of activity. It may encourage incremental and appropriable (i.e., patentable) research, but may discourage more long-term, basic research.
Data and results
We combine data from four main sources: (i) U.S. Compustat, (ii) M&A data from Thomson SDC Platinum, (iii) scienti…c publications from ISI Web of Knowledge, and (iv) patent data from PatStat (USPTO and EPO). We use three di¤erent …rm samples. Our principal results pertain to publicly traded …rms in the U.S. We also provide additional evidence using a large sample of M&A deals, and a sample of European …rms that either patent or publish. The latter two samples are described in more detail along with the corresponding empirical results.
We focus our econometric analysis on U.S. Compustat …rms with at least one patent over the period 1975-2007, leaving us with 1,014 …rms and 11,304 …rm-year observations. To capture their investment in science, we match these …rms to ISI Web of Science (matching …rm name with the a¢ liation …eld for each publications record). We identify approximately 312 thousand articles with at least one author employed by a Compustat …rm in our sample. We select only articles in "hardscience" journals (natural sciences and engineering), and unless noted otherwise, we weight articles by citations. To measure investment in technology, we match our …rm sample to patents granted by U.S. and European patent o¢ ces from PatStat. To avoid double counting of patents on the same invention, we exclude European patents that belong to the same family as an already matched U.S. patent. We also weight patents by citations. For both patent and article citations, we use all citations received, normalized by the mean number of citations received by the cohort.
The main variables used in the analysis of Compustat …rms include market value, book value of capital, R&D stock, publications stock, and patents stock. 4 Panel A in Table 1 summarizes 4 Following Griliches (1986), market value is de…ned as the sum of the values of common stock, preferred stock, and total debt net of current assets. The book value of capital includes net plant, property and equipment, inventories, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, and intangibles other than R&D. R&D stock is calculated using a perpetual inventory method with a 15 percent depreciation rate (Hall et al., 2005) . So the R&D stock, GRD, in year t is GRDt = Rt + (1 )GRDt 1 where Rt is the R&D expenditure in year t and = 0:15. Publications stock in year t is calculated in the same way as P ublications stockt = P ubt + (1 )P ublications stockt 1 where P ubt is the citations-weights ‡ow of publications in year t. Citation weights are the ratio between the number of citations an descriptive statistics for Compustat …rms. The mean market value of the …rms in our sample is $5.9 billion (of which $3 billion are in physical assets), and mean R&D spending is $129 million. Their mean scienti…c publications stock is 58 and patents stock is 174. Approximately 28 percent of our sample …rms publish a scienti…c article at least once during the sample period.
[Insert Table 1 intensity, the ratio of R&D to sales, has remained stable over time at about 3 percent. Importantly, the share of patent citations to science (the ratio between patent citations to scienti…c journals and total number of citations the patent makes) has remained stable over time. This …nding, which we explore more carefully in Section 4.1, suggests that a decline in the use of science in innovation is not likely to explain …rms'withdrawal from science. 
Econometric Results

Internal investments in science
Columns 1-4 in Table 2a present the estimation results of time trends in investments in science using within-…rm speci…cations. We report robust standard errors and cluster by …rm. Publica These changes in publication output could re ‡ect either a reduction in the private value of scienti…c capability or an increase in its marginal cost (or both). An increase in marginal cost would reduce the quantity of research but also increase its average value. To distinguish between shifts in value and cost, we examine how the elasticity of market value with respect to publication and patent stocks has changed over time. Interpreting estimates from market value regressions is not straightforward. Our interpretation is that the decline in publishing output re ‡ects a reduction in the derived demand for private investment in scienti…c research. Taken together, the results in Table 2a imply that the decline in publication output is not merely a matter of possibly higher marginal cost of research but instead re ‡ects a reduction in the "demand" for scienti…c capability. The results imply that whereas the private value of technical capability has increase (or, at a minimum, has not decreased), scienti…c capability has become privately less valuable.
[ Insert Tables 2a-2b here] 3.1.2. Publication output as a measure of investment in science?
Scienti…c publications are a common measure of investments in basic research. However, it is possible that our results simply re ‡ect changes in publication behavior. If …rms have, for some reason, changed practices such that there is a greater emphasis on secrecy, scienti…c publications may become a less accurate measure of investment in research or of scienti…c capability. On conceptual grounds, Gans et al. (2013) argue that patenting and publishing are complements rather than substitutes. Stronger patent protection ought to increase rather than decrease publication. However, scientists with limited time may allocate more time to patents and less to publications if …rms are increasing the rewards for patents as compared to publications. This would make patenting and publishing substitutes rather than complements (Bhaskarabhatla and Hegde, 2014).
Insofar as companies are reducing publications to avoid information leakage, we would expect publications in applied journals to decline faster than those in basic research journals. This is because applied journals are more likely to contain commercially sensitive and patentable information.
As Table 2b shows, we …nd the opposite.
For the results reported in Table 2b , we match the journals in our data to the CHI journal database (Leten, Kelchtermans, and Belderbos, 2010). The complete CHI database includes a list of 17,753 journals which have been classi…ed by their level of research "basicness". About 40 percent of the publications in our sample were matched to CHI journals. Columns 1 and 2 in Table   2b distinguish between …rm publications in basic and applied journal. A publication is classi…ed as basic if it is published in a journal with a CHI level of 4 (the highest value), and as applied if it is published in a journal with a CHI level of 1 (the lowest level). We …nd that the decline in publications over time (within …rms) is strongly evident for basic publications, but not for applied publications. The decline in publications is also not evident for publications in low impact factor journals (column 3). This suggests that the decline in publications documented in Table 2a is driven by a decline in basic research. Column 4 examines the time trend in the share of …rm publications in basic journals (CHI level of 4), for the subsample of publishing …rms. We …nd that the share of basic publications in total …rm publications has fallen over time.
Columns 5-6 present the corresponding results for stock market value. Column 5 includes separate measures for basic and applied publication stocks. The decline over time in the elasticity of value with respect to publications is evident for basic publications (an estimate of -0.02), but not applied publications (estimate indistinguishable from zero). Column 6 focuses on the subsample of publishing …rms and shows that the elasticity of …rm value with respect to the share of …rm publications in basic journals is positive and quantitatively large (an estimate of 0.05), and that this elasticity has fallen in value over time. Finally, in unreported regressions we …nd that all these results hold also when we use the journal impact factor to distinguish between publications, instead of classifying publications by the CHI index.
In sum, Table 2b shows that …rms are publishing less largely because they are publishing less basic research rather than publishing less applied research. Further, the decline in the value of scienti…c capability is largely because basic scienti…c capability is less valuable. These patterns are inconsistent with the notion that the decline in publication re ‡ects mere changes in publication behavior or greater emphasis on secrecy. Rather, large …rms appear to have changed their R&D composition-they have been moving away from basic research and toward more applied and patentable research.
Patterns within technology domains
Tables 3 and 4 explore how the above pattern of results varies across technology domains. We classify …rms into technology domains based on the distribution of their patents across the following technology …elds: biotechnology, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, electronics, information technologies, semiconductors, and telecommunications. Overall, we …nd that the trends reported in Table 2a are present in all technology domains. In Table 3 , we interact a time trend with technology domains dummies. Column 1 shows that publications fell in all technology domains. Table 4 examines the relationship between scienti…c capability (measured by the stock of publications) and market value, within technology domains. For this analysis, we assigned …rms to technology domains using patenting classes where the plurality of the patents are classifed. As in Table 2a , it shows that the implied private value of scienti…c capability has declined in all technology domains except biotechnology. The principal takeaway from Tables 3 and 4 is that the decline in research that we have documented is broad based, and not driven by any particular technology domain.
[Insert Tables 3-4 here] 3.1.4. Value of scienti…c capability in M&A Our estimates of the private value of scienti…c capability rely upon stock market values. These re ‡ect the collective judgment of investors. The prices that …rms in our sample pay to acquire other …rms, and its relationship to the scienti…c ability provide an estimate the implied value that managers put on scienti…c capability. For this analyis, we use the set of acquisitions by our sample …rms where data on acquisition price, percentage of acquired equity, assets and sales is available in SDC Platinum. We further restrict the sample to targets from OECD countries. We match the Table 1 above summarizes the descriptive statistics for target …rms. The average target …rm is valued at $162 million, has $79 million in assets, generates $138 million in annual sales, and makes $17 million in pro…ts. Of the target …rms that have at least one publication, the mean stock of publications is about 4 with a median value of 0.2. Of the target …rms with at least one patent, the mean stock of patents (the sum of USPTO and EPO patents) is 30 with a median value of 3.6. Table 5 presents the estimation results for the value of scienti…c capability based on acquisition price. The estimation results are consistent with the stock market value regressions and show that the implied value of scienti…c capability has indeed fallen. Column 1 interacts publication and patent stocks with time trend. Consistent with our previous …ndings, the elasticity of acquisition price with respect to publication stock is falling over time. On the other hand, the elasticity of acquisition price with respect to patent stock is rising. Columns 2-3 use more ‡exible speci…cations which split the sample at the median year value.
Panel B in
As before, the coe¢ cient estimate on publication stock is very large and statistically signi…cant in the early sample period (0.17), and falls nearly to zero in the later sample period (-0.04). We easily reject the null hypothesis that these two coe¢ cients are statistically identical. Column 4 shows that the same pattern of results continues to hold when we restrict the sample to target …rms that either patent at the USPTO or EPO or publish. Column 5 shows that the results are not driven by the 1999-2001 IT bubble.
The main takeaway from Table 5 is that the value managers place on scienti…c capability of 13 their target …rm (as proxied by its stock of publications) has fallen over time whereas the value they place on the technical capability of their target …rm (as proxied by its stock of patents) has not decreased. This is broadly consistent with the suggestion that large …rms are shifting their focus away from basic research and toward more applied activities.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Post-acquisition publication behavior
If the value of scienti…c capabilities has declined and acquiring …rms are becoming more reluctant to invest in science, we would expect to see a decline in publication activity by researchers of the target …rms after the acquisition. A few papers stress the di¢ culties acquiring …rms face in making productive use of the human capital they acquire in the form of inventors and researchers.
For instance, Valentini (2012) concludes that acquisitions in medical devices and photographic equipment between 1988 and 1996 resulted in a greater focus by the acquirer on short-term results.
Measuring post-acquisition publication activity is challenging because the acquired …rm may cease to exist as an independent unit following the acquisition. To account for publications of potentially dissolved units, we include publications by acquiring …rms in the post-acquisition period where the authors also appear on pre-acquisition publications belonging to the acquired …rm. 5 If large …rms are withdrawing from science, then the scientists who are hired through acquisitions should reduce their publication activity post-acquisition, and the reduction should be larger for more recent acquisitions. Table 6 presents the estimation results of a within-…rm variation in publication behavior postacquisition. For each …rm, we examine a three-year window around the acquisition year and estimate the e¤ect of a post-acquisition dummy-a dummy that receives the value of one for the three postacquisition years and zero for three pre-acquisition years. Columns 1-6 present the estimation results for the ‡ow of publications. Column 1 shows that publications tend to drop post-acquisition.
Comparing columns 2 and 3, we see that the drop is especially marked for acquisitions in the We repeat this exercise, this time with patents. We check whether inventors from acquired …rms also reduce patenting after acquisition. Instead, as we can see in columns 7-9, on average, patenting activity rises after the …rm has been acquired, although this rise takes place mostly in the …rst half of the sample, while in the second half there is no change in patenting activity post-acquisition.
In sum, Table 6 provides additional support for the conjecture that …rms have lowered their willingness to pay to acquire external scienti…c capability over time. In part, at least, this is because the acquiring …rms are less willing to invest in science internally. The fruits of science, here proxied by patents, continue to be valued but not science itself.
[Insert Table 6 here] 4. Mechanisms
The use of science in innovation
Firms invest in science for several reasons. First, scienti…c discoveries may themselves lead to innovation. If new scienti…c knowledge is becoming less relevant for commercial innovation, …rms will be less likely to invest in research. Tracing the application of science to commercial ends is very di¢ cult. One proxy, admittedly highly imperfect, is the citations patents make to scienti…c publications. Narin et al. (1997) found that, of the papers published in 1988 cited by patents issued in 1993, over 40 percent were from public research institutes, while nearly 27 percent were produced by …rms. If applying scienti…c knowledge to industry is becoming much harder or more costly, there ought to be fewer citations to science by patents.
In Table 7 we examine trends in the citations to scienti…c publications by patents produced by our sample …rms. Because we are interested in patent citations to science, we purged the "non patent references" of trade journals, news articles, press releases and the like. Visual inspections indicate that the remaining references can reasonably be considered to be references to scienti…c publications. As shown in column 1, patent citations to science remain stable over time. Columns 2 and 3 split the sample by …rms that invest in science and …rms that do not. For both subsamples we …nd an insigni…cant coe¢ cient estimate on time trend. Columns 4-7 explore variation across broad technology …elds. No …eld experiences a decline in the number of citations to science over time. Consistent with this, NSF data show that whereas about 10.6 percent of U.S. utility patents cited scienti…c publications in 1998, the share had increased to 11.9 percent by 2010. Over the same period, the share of scienti…c publications cited in a patent had largely remained unchanged, at around 1.7 percent (NSF S&E Indicators, 2012, Table 5 -49) .
In unreported robustness checks, we reran the analysis only counting references to articles published in journals in the CHI journal database. In the "clean" sample, mean patent citations to science at the …rm-year level is 2.4 (a median of 0.5). As an additional robustness check, we reran estimates restricting our attention to citations to journals with a high (above median) ISI impact factor. We …nd results very similar to those reported in the paper.
[Insert Tables 7-8 
here]
Though patents may continue to cite science, they may be citing older science. If innovation is less likely to require new scienti…c knowledge, …rms may reduce their own investment in creating such new knowledge. Further, investments in scienti…c capability may serve to absorb and use existing scienti…c knowledge, the vast bulk of which is external to the …rm. If, over time, external scienti…c knowledge has become more accessible to …rms due to developments in markets for technology and improvements in information technology, the need to invest in scienti…c capability may have fallen.
We examine whether innovations rely upon increasingly older scienti…c knowledge, and how this di¤ers with the scienti…c capability of the …rm. Speci…cally, we ask if the average age of scienti…c publications cited by patents has changed over time, and whether these trends di¤er between …rms that do publish and those that do not. We expect that if innovation is less reliant upon recent scienti…c knowledge, the average age of the publications cited by patents should increase. If scienti…c capability enables …rms to use more recent science in their innovations, this should be re ‡ected in a lower average age of publications cited by their patents. That is, publishing …rms should cite more recent publications in their patents than non-publishing …rms. However, if scienti…c capability becomes less relevant for absorbing external knowledge, the di¤erence in the vintage of articles cited by publishing and non-publishing …rms should shrink over time. Table 8 presents the results where we use …rm-year observations with at least one patent citation to science. This leaves us with 850 …rms and 6,251 observations. Our dependent variable is the average publication year of articles by all patents of the focal …rm in a given year. Our results are remarkably insensitive to whether we use industry …xed e¤ects (columns 1 and 2) or …rm …xed e¤ects (columns 3 and 4), and they are very similar across major technology …elds (columns 5-8).
The …rst point to note is that the coe¢ cient of the time trend ranges between 0.97 and 1.01, and it is statistically indistinguishable from 1. In plain words, patents that are a year younger cite papers that are on average published one year later than papers cited by one year older patents.
The vintage of science used in innovation, as measured by the relative average age of the scienti…c literature cited by patents, has remained unchanged.
Second, the coe¢ cient of the log of publications ranges from about 0.22 to 0.35. Thus, a doubling of publication stock is associated with a reduction of about three months (column 1) to four months (column 3) in the average age of the cited scienti…c publications. This suggests that scienti…c capability is important in enabling …rms to absorb more recent scienti…c knowledge, although of course it is also likely that …rms that publish also work on more cutting-edge innovation.
Finally, there is very little evidence to suggest that investments in science have become less e¤ective over time in helping …rms absorb external science. Columns 2 and 4 include an interaction between the stock of publications and a time trend. The coe¢ cient of the time trend is small and insigni…cant. It is similarly small and insigni…cant when we look across technology domains, with the exception of chemicals. 6 To sum up, we …nd no evidence that science has become less relevant for innovation, or that the relevant scienti…c knowledge is of older vintage. We also …nd no evidence that internal scienti…c capability is becoming less e¤ective in helping …rms absorb scienti…c knowledge.
American regulatory changes
Changes in the U.S. regulatory environment such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 are said to have discouraged large American …rms from making longer-term investments, including investments in scienti…c capability. To test the conjecture that our results are driven by American regulatory changes, we expand our data to European …rms. We match publication and patent records to all European …rms from Amadeus (private and public …rms). We identify about 58,000 publications by 3,642 …rms, and 210,000 patents by 10,053 …rms. Lacking data on R&D expenditures for European …rms, we restrict attention to …rms that either patent or publish at least once during the sample period of 1997-2007, the period for which …nancial data are available. Of these …rms, about 31 percent publish at least once, and the vast majority, over 90 percent, patent at least once between 1997 and 2007. Table 9 presents the estimation results for within-…rm changes in number of publications and patents. We observe a very similar pattern of results for the European …rm sample. Publications decline over time (column 1), even after controlling for …rm sales, which are available only for a subsample of …rms for 1997-2007 (column 2). Publications decline at about the same rate for private as for public …rms (column 3), which makes it less likely that short-termism, sometimes attributed to public equity markets, is the reason for the decline in scienti…c research by …rms.
The rate of decline is similar when we restrict attention to …rms that are present in the sample for longer than 10 years (column 4), and is even greater when we focus only on …rms that started to invest in science prior to 1980 (column 5). Finding that European …rms display similar reductions in investment in science as American …rms is not consistent with the idea that speci…c regulatory changes in American institutions drive the results of this paper. Nor do they provide support for the argument that short-termism in stock markets is responsible for the decline.
[Insert Table 9 here]
Globalization
Another possible explanation for why large …rms have reduced their investments in scienti…c capability is increased competition from overseas, particularly from low-wage countries. To explore this mechanism, we follow Bloom et al. (forthcoming) and calculate the level of Chinese import penetration as the share of the value of imports originating from China in the total imports in an industry from 1998 to 2008. 7 For each industry we compute the change in Chinese import penetration from 1998 to 2008. We observe a signi…cant rise in imports from China over time across industries: import penetration rates more than double, from an average of 2 percent in 1998 to 5 percent in 2008. We use changes in Chinese import penetration as our measure of increased globalization. (column 1), the coe¢ cient estimate on time trend is negative and statistically signi…cant from zero (-0.01 with a standard error of 0.01). After controlling for Chinese imports (column 2), the coe¢ cient estimate of the time trend in publication is small and insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero. Columns 3-5 presents the results for the relationship between three-year changes in Chinese import penetration and corresponding changes in patent output, R&D expenditures, and physical investment. As with publications, we …nd a negative relationship for R&D and physical investment.
It appears that increases in import competition from low-wage countries (proxied here by imports from China) tend to reduce forward-looking investments in both tangible and intangible capital.
Interestingly, however, and consistent with Bloom et al. (forthcoming), the propensity of our …rms to patent increases in sectors that experience an in ‡ux of Chinese imports over time. Table 11 presents the estimation results for stock market value. Column 1 includes interactions terms between changes in Chinese import penetration and publication and patent stocks. We …nd that the stock market value of publications declines with an increase in Chinese imports, but the value of patent stock does not. Columns 2 and 3 report results for industries which experienced a sharp rise in Chinese import penetration and those that did not. As shown in Column 2, the decline in the value of publications and the increase in the value of patents over time are strongly evident in the industries facing high competition from China, but not in those insulated from Chinese imports (column 3). For industries insulated from Chinese imports, the value of publications and patents remains stable over time.
Overall, therefore, our evidence suggests that growing globalization is a plausible mechanism for why large …rms in advanced economies are withdrawing from science. It is important to stress that, as with other analyses, we are measuring association rather than causal structure. For instance, it is possible that industries where opportunities for radical innovation-innovation drawing upon scienti…c knowledge-are declining are also those which face greater import competition from China.
Our objective here is not to provide de…nitive results but to see whether the data provide prima facie support for some mechanisms relative to others. We also emphasize that the decline in the value that large …rms attach to scienti…c capability predates 2001, the year China entered the WTO. Thus, China should be seen as an instantiation of a broader trend, not fully captured in our empirical analysis, wherein growing competition from lower-wage countries is pushing …rms away from science and toward more applied research.
[Insert Tables 10-11 here] 
Firm scope
Large …rms may also be withdrawing from science because they are becoming less diversi…ed. We use …rm-level data on sales concentration from the Compustat line of business database to test the idea that …rms with an increasingly narrower product base are most likely to reduce their investments in science. The results of Table 12 are e¤ectively within-…rm estimates, relating changes research to changes in the …rm's scope. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the three-year change in the output of scienti…c publications, and the key independent variables are also computed as three-
year changes. As before, the standard errors are robust to serial correlation and clustered at the …rm level. We see that there is a strong negative relationship between changes in …rms scope and publications, controlling for size and changes in the R&D stock. Based on the estimates from column 1, we …nd that moving from the lowest to the highest decile of decreases in …rm scope is associated with a drop of 87 percent of sample average decline in publications. However, as columns 2 and 3
show, the decline in patents and R&D investment is much smaller and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no decline.
Columns 4-5 examine whether the decline in the stock market value of publications is more pronounced in the subsample of …rms that have become more focused over time. Column 4 shows that for …rms which have narrowed their scope, the implied stock market value of publications declines over time. By contrast, as Column 5 shows, for …rms whose scope has widened, there is no such decline. Also consistent with the general trends reported earlier, the implied stock market value of patents increases rather than decreases, for both types of …rms. Moreover, the implied value of patent for …rms with narrowing scope grows at least as fast as that of …rms whose scope has not narrowed over time. Overall, our results are consistent with the conjecture that investments in science bene…ts mostly diversi…ed …rms. Firms that have narrowed their scope derive less value from scienti…c capability and have accordingly reduced their investments in science.
[Insert Table 12 here]
Discussion
The discourse among managers and strategy consultants often centers on how …rms can grow. Innovation features prominently in such discussions. Innovation has many sources but in the ultimate analysis, without advances in the stock of scienti…c knowledge, technical progress will eventually falter, as will the rate of innovation. Of course, …rms have drawn upon the stock of public scienti…c knowledge to fuel their innovation e¤orts, but they also invested in developing and maintaining 20 internal scienti…c capability as well. In so doing, they hoped for new goods and services to emerge from research labs, but also banked on in-house scientists to guide technical search, acquire relevant external technology, and serve as talent magnets. They did so understanding that investments in internal scienti…c capability would not pay o¤ right away but would take time to materialize. Only …rms willing to take the long view would invest in internal science.
While a few papers have attempted to quantify the size of the private returns to investments in science, to the best of our knowledge no previous work has examined how the value of such investments has changed over time. In addition, few studies jointly analyze changes in both the value and the quantum of investment in science. 8 We use data on both publication output and the implied stock market value of publications for all publicly traded American …rms, for over a quarter century. We verify that similar patterns hold for European …rms. We additionally analyze acquisitions of small, research-based …rms to infer the implied value managers place on scienti…c capability in the target …rms, and we examine the publication behavior of target-…rm scientists following the acquisition. By piecing together these complementary pieces of evidence, we provide the most comprehensive evidence to date on the changing structure of corporate R&D in large …rms.
In addition, the present paper also explores a number of factors that, in recent times, may have induced large …rms to reduce their investments in science. One factor is narrower …rm scope. At least since the 1990s, many …rms have been focusing on their "core competencies," possibly as the result of growing competition. While concentrating on a narrower set of products or a smaller portion of the value chain can have advantages, basic research (and its unpredictable fruits) may be less valuable to narrowly focused …rms. This can in principle explain both a reduction in investment in science by less diversi…ed …rms, and a lower implied value for basic research investment.
A second factor that may have induced …rms to withdraw from science is globalization. Globalization and increased competition may reduce the payo¤ to innovation, reducing the value of scienti…c capability. Competition from low-cost countries can also depress private investments in science by reducing cash ‡ows, thereby reducing the amount of internal funds available to fund research. This second …nancial constraints argument can explain why …rms invest less in science, but is hard to reconcile with a decline in the market value premium for scienti…c capability. If …rms that invest in scienti…c capability are the ones that are able to overcome …nancial constraints, then the market should respond positively to such investments, not negatively. One possibility is that markets, as well as managers, become more short-term oriented when …rm pro…tability declines (as 8 However, Simeth and Cincera's (2013) results imply a decline in the value of publications. a result of global competition). Alternatively, it could be that investment in internal science is an ine¢ cient relic of a past long gone, when big American and European …rms could a¤ord to "waste" resources. In this view, large …rms are ine¢ cient performers of research and need to be pushed to outsource research to smaller and more nimble partners.
We …nd little support for other potential explanations for our …ndings. One is that large …rms have merely changed their publication practices rather than reduce their investment in science. A decline in publication output may re ‡ect not changes in R&D composition, but rather a rejection of "open science" in favor of greater focus on patents or secrecy. Were this so, we would expect large …rms to reduce publications in applied scienti…c journals, which contain …ndings more likely to be commercially relevant. We …nd instead that the decline in …rm publications is most prominent for publications in high-impact scienti…c journals, as well as in journals dedicated to basic rather than applied research. Furthermore, if changes in publication were simply due to changes in disclosure strategy but …rms continued to value scienti…c capability to the same extent, we would not expect to …nd any reduction in the premium …rms pay to acquire scienti…c capability through M&A. Instead, we …nd that the premium for the scienti…c capability of …rms acquired in M&A has declined. This suggests that the decline in publications and the increase in patenting are not merely driven by a change in publication strategy. Rather, large …rms appear to be moving away from basic and scienti…c research and toward more applied and incremental research.
Other mechanisms for which we …nd little support in our data include a reduction in the relevance of science for innovation, a diminished importance of absorptive capacity, and changes in U.S. regulatory environment. One, admittedly imperfect, way of tracing the application of science to technology is to use the citations patents make to scienti…c publications. We show that scienti…c knowledge continues to be relevant for innovation (i.e., patents continue to cite science) and that new science in particular remains important (i.e., the vintage of scienti…c knowledge used in innovation has not changed over time). Thus, our …ndings suggest that the withdrawal of …rms from science is likely to leave an important gap in the relevant scienti…c base for innovation.
Using patent citations to scienti…c publications we also show that …rms with higher scienti…c capability are able to draw upon more recent scienti…c knowledge in their innovations, and that the relatively higher absorptive capacity they so enjoy has not eroded over time. This suggests that the reduction in investments in science is unlikely to be because scienti…c capability is now less helpful in enabling …rms to use external knowledge. Finally, using data on European …rms, we show that American regulatory changes are unlikely to drive our results. Needless to say, all these tests have limitations (for instance, absorptive capacity could confer other advantages to …rms rather than simply facilitating access to more recent scienti…c knowledge) and further exploring potential causal mechanisms remains an important avenue for future research.
Concluding Remarks
Our results indicate that the willingness of large …rms to invest in scienti…c capability has declined. This is re ‡ected in their behavior (e.g., their propensity to publish), the acquisition price of the science-intensive …rms they acquire, and the stock market premium that investors attach to scienti…c capability of the …rms. It is also consistent with other evidence reported in the literature on the increase in alliances and licensing, as well as qualitative evidence on the decline in corporate research.
A pessimistic interpretation of these results is that private research is in decline. Established companies can no longer emulate …rms such as DuPont, AT&T, or Merck, whose investments in research in the past have signi…cantly advanced the frontiers of human knowledge. Unless public funding can make up the de…cit, technical progress will slacken and eventually reduce productivity growth. Managers in established …rms, struggling to satisfy increasingly assertive investors, may be disinclined to make long-term risky bets on internal science. They may look to other means to achieve their growth targets, including international expansion and sourcing inventions and knowledge from outside the …rm.
The last option, external sourcing of innovation, points to a less alarming interpretation. It may well be that other organizations-smaller …rms and universities-are making up the shortfall in investment in research. According to this interpretation, what is happening is a reallocation of research from large corporate labs to more e¢ cient organizations. To the extent that public support for research falls, external sourcing may be a less viable option because the aggregate production of knowledge falls.
The enhanced e¢ ciency of how research is performed can substantially o¤set the shortfall in the quantum of investment in research. Even so, scienti…c entrepreneurs need to heed these trends.
Acquisition is a common exit for start-ups. If acquirers will not pay for scienti…c research, as our results show, it implies that start-ups will have to invest longer, until such time as the research bears fruit and the resulting innovations can be converted into patents and products. Not all organizations that are good at research are also good at converting their research into commercially relevant forms. Requiring all research-intensive start-ups to move downstream will undoubtedly be ine¢ cient. More importantly, it would dissuade some start-ups from investing in research, reducing 23 the overall investment into an activity that is believed to have high social returns. We match our publication dataset to all Amadeus (private and public) firms. Financial data is available only from 1997, not for all firms. R&D is never reported. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. 
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